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INTRODUCTION
When speaking of such terms as « dialectical » or « critical »
psychology, one generally first thinks of the names of a num-
ber of well-known French, German and Soviet psychologists
(for example Sève, Holzkamp, Rubinstejn, Vygotskij). Much
less notoriety is enjoyed by the representatives of an influential
and well-organised school which originated in the United States
under the name of « dialectical psychology ». Klaus F. Riegel
can be regarded as the enthusiastic and unusually productive
initiator of this school. Its basis was laid in the latter half of
the sixties, when a discussion about the foundations of psycho-
logy arose in America. Riegel realised the perils of a psycho-
logy in danger of losing its ties to a social-historical context.
Who was this man and what were his ideas? In order to
answer this question, we shall first give a brief sketch of his
life, and in doing so present a general introduction to certain
concepts. We shall then describe his ideas concerning the hi-
story of psychology in relation to social developments. Then
the discussion will centre upon his critical remarks on establi-
shed (developmental) psychological theories, in which we shall
look at Riegel's attempts to construct an alternative dialectical
paradigm, examining more fully his methodological notions.
Finally, through a citation-analysis, we shall underline the im-
portance of Riegel and of American dialectical psychology.
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 This article is a re-working of an article by Goossens and Van I jzendoorn
(1980) and of a chapter from the book by Van Ijzendoom, Van der Veer
and Goossens (1981).
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Klaus Riegel was born in 1925 in Berlin, where he spent his
youth. After the war, he started out working as a maintenance
mechanic, but soon began studies in mathematics and physics.
Two years later he left for America, acquiring his M.A. at the
University of Minnesota (1955). After returning to Germany,
he started on a thesis on the intellectual faculties of the elderly
(Riegel, 1957). Shortly after its completion, he returned to the
United States to continue his research in that area together
with his wife. Among others, he conducted longitudinal resear-
ch into the effect of aging on intelligence. He began to publish
regularly, primarily in gerontological journals, and now and
then on psycholinguistics.
At first glance, this would appear nothing out of the ordi-
nary, simply the scientific career of a researcher interested in
his subject and, entirely within scientific tradition, reporting
regularly on his work. However, this impression is only par-
tially accurate. During this time, Riegel must have read and
thought an enormous amount about the foundations of his
discipline, for after 1965, an essential change can be observed
in the content of his articles. In 1965, he published an article
on the effect of social differences on language use and in 1966,
his first theoretical contributions to the journal Human Deve-
lopment appeared (Riegel, 1966). This is the beginning of a
series of theoretical articles ultimately leading to an attempt to
formulate a dialectical-psychological theory. At the same time,
Riegel was active in the area of methodology; he not only
wanted to include the changing individual, but also the chan-
ging society in his designs (Riegel et d.> 1967). Other metho-
dologists, notably Baltes and Schaie, share his dissatisfaction
with longitudinal and cross-sectional designs. Riegel was also
occupied with the problem of the ahistorical character of (de-
velopmental) psychology. He himself sought a solution in the
link-up with the historical sciences, which could profit from
the methods of developmental psychology (and vice versa)
(Riegel, 1967).
In 1970, he joined the editorial staff of the magazine he had
so often published in: Human Development (previously: Vita
Humana). Riegel now had a forum at his disposal for venting
his ideas and highlighting the work of those thinking in similar
directions. His own ideas concerning the social influence on
psychological development crystallised in part through the i-
deas of Rubinstejn, made accessible to English readers by the
work of Payne (1968). In a now classic article (1972) he
wrote on the relationships between science (and in particular
developmental psychology) and society. At his instigation, an-
nual conferences were held on dialectics. A « Network for
Dialectical Psychologists » was established and a Dialectical
Psychology Newsletter appeared. This was the birth of the
American variant of dialectical psychology. Riegel collected his
essays in Psychology of History and Development (1976), but
died a year later at the height of his career. Two books were
published posthumously: Psychology, Mon Amour: A Counter-
text (1978) and Foundations of Dialectical Psychology (1979).
RIEGELS' VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
« A spectre is haunting Western psychology; the spectre of
scientific dialectics. The scaffold of the academic world is sha-
king; the time for its transformation is near » (Riegel, 1979, p.
14). With these elegant words, Riegel sounds the death-knell
upon two, to him, failing traditions within developmental
psychology, the « capitalistic » tradition and the « mercantile »
tradition. What then is the core of Riegel's objections to these
still current tendencies in theory development and research in
developmental psychology?
For many years, Anglo-Saxon scientific study was dominated
by the « capitalistic » orientation of Hobbes, Locke, Galton,
Hall and Gesell. This orientation crystallised into a social-Dar-
winistic interpretation of onto - and phylogenetic development.
According to Riegel, such slogans as « bellum omnium contra
omnes » and « struggle for life, survival of the fittest » capture
succinctly the essence of this interpretation. For psychology,
this meant, for example, that in studying individual differen-
ces, the young white male adult, involved in business or in-
dustry, was to be regarded as the most successful « survivor »,
to be elevated to the criterion upon which all other individuals
would be measured2. If individuals or groups did not meet
this standard, they were simply classified as backward, deviant
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 Think of the glorification of the WASP, the white Anglo-Saxon prote-
stant, regarded as the ideal worker. Compare also the YAVIS, the young,
attractive, verbal intelligent and sociable person, whose prognosis for therapy
is considered favourable on the basis of these characteristics.
etc. Children were thus only characterised ex negativo as im-
perfect adults, differing not in the qualitative but in the quan-
titative sense from the ideal adult. By empirical-descriptive
means, attempts were made to describe trends and create stan-
dards by which individuals could be measured. Within this
conception, development is a gradually increasing accumulation
of knowledge and skills. That this orientation was able to
dominate developmental psychology, especially in Anglo-Saxon
countries, is in Riegel's view attributable to specific external,
i.e. economic and cultural circumstances. In this connection,
Riegel mentions the wide-spread myth in these countries of
progress through unfettered competition, and the typical Engli-
sh predilection for hunting and breeding, as paving the way for
a capitalistic perspective in developmental psychology.
As opposed to England's colonial and capitalistic tradition,
Europe's most important countries had, in particular, a strong
mercantile tradition. There a new middle class arose, not as
privileged as the wealthy landed aristocracy, but considerably
better off than the working class. Riegel believed that the
discrepancy between their social interests and their privileges
ultimately led to the French Revolution. Competition was per-
mitted especially within the classes, but not between (the diffe-
rent hierarchically arranged) classes. According to Riegel, this
gave rise to a « mercantile » tradition in which the value of dif-
ferences in background could be appreciated. Children were no
longer regarded as inferior adults but appreciated for themsel-
ves and regarded in the context of their peers. By nature, man
was good; it was society that gave rise to differences. The
most important exponent of these ideas was Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Fröbel and (later) Montessori followed in his foo-
tsteps, introducing a more child-orientated approach in educa-
tion. Riegel believes that Spranger, too, was influential through
his plea for an understanding attitude towards the adolescent
sub-culture. Piaget was the last link in this chain of liberal
scientific thinkers. Throughout, development is seen as stepwi-
se discontinuous progress through a series of stages which can-
not be compared to one another. « While competition within
stages is conceivable, it is not of great importance and is reje-
cted as driving force across stages » (Riegel, 1972, p. 134).
Riegel thus suggests a correspondence between the sociological
concept of class and the psychological concept of stage. Just as
mobility from the lower to the upper classes was rarely possi-
blé, and the representatives of each class were regarded enti-
rely on an individual basis, each stage of mental activity also
had an entirely individual character. Because of the emphasis
he laid upon the young child's « egocentric character », Riegel
regards Piaget as one of the « mercantile » scientific thinkers.
On the other hand, Vygotskij would belong to the « socialist »
scientific thinkers because of his emphasis upon the social
aspects of development.
Riegel regards the « mercantile » approach as a step in the
right direction and does, indeed, welcome the growing interest
among American researchers for this school. On the other hand
he is not an advocate of a wholesale adoption of this approach,
because « science and knowledge, as well as society in general,
can advance only if the divergent viewpoints are integrated at
higher and more abstract levels » (Riegel, 1972, p. 135). By
elevating both viewpoints to a higher level, dialectical psycho-
logy must provide a solution. Development is neither an accu-
mulation of information by an, in essence, passive organism,
nor the spontaneous production of new ways of thinking. Cha-
racteristic of Riegel's synthetic concept is the notion that the
individual should be regarded as an actively changing organism
in a continually changing world and that both the individual
and the environment in which the individual lives should
be the object of study and research. Following upon the
marxist anthropological notion that man changes the world
through his labour and, in turn, is himself influenced by
this changing world, the dialectic between the individual and
the environment should be a major theme in the dialectical
school. Riegel summarises his concepts in a diagram in which
subject (individual) and object (environment) have either an
active or a passive character. In doing so, he arrives at a
classification into four schools, and it should be clear (from the
above) that he has an affinity to the active subject in an active
environment.
Individual
passive active
environment
passive
active
Locke/Hume
Ebbinghaus
Mannheim
Vygotskij /Skinner
Leibnitz
Piaget/Chamsky
Hegel/Marx
Rubinatejn
FIG. 1. Classification of four trends in psychology.
In his attempt to uncover some trends in the history of
psychology and to anchor it in social developments, Riegel tries
to describe this history from an externalistic point of view
rather than through the traditional internalistic 'Ideengeschich-
te'. He is not, however, entirely successful. Riegel's description
is actually only in part externalistic, for the lines he draws
from Darwin to Gallon, Stanley Hall, Terman and Gesell, and
from Rousseau to Fröbel, Montessori, Spranger and Piaget can
be interpreted much more easily from an internalistic vantage
point, that is as the assimilation of ideas of one scientific
thinker (or group of them) by others 3. Striking is that Riegel
devotes no attention at all to behaviorism, a school which at
that time was on the rise and which was based on entirely
opposite notions of human behavior, namely on the influence
of the environment. Riegel suggests that Darwin's ideas were
received warmly by the aristocratic upper classes of the popu-
lation, whilst it was the middle classes who were attracted to
the notions of Rousseau. The question then arises why it were
the Anglo-Saxon ideas that gained solid ground in America,
despite the absence of a traditional aristocracy. It is not unli-
kely dial the dissemination of ideas in America was particu-
larly the result on increasing immigration from England, which
suggests that it was not the aristocracy, (who did not, in fact,
emigrate) but others who were responsible for this dissemina-
tion. In that sense, Riegel's analysis would appear to have
some serious shortcomings, not transcending the level of gene-
ral impressions. It is also curious diat the philosopher Locke is
not mentioned in connection with the opposing views of the
Anglo-Saxon countries and the continent. And yet it was Locke
who even before Rousseau claimed that children should be
regarded as a separate category, which was not to be judged by
3
 In addition, Riegel's classification of the researches mentioned seems
a bit contrived. Stanley Hall, for example, was strongly influenced by the
theory of evolution, but he certainly did not endorse the notion that develop-
ment is a quantitative, cumulative process. On the contrary, he also distingui-
shed stages in child development, namely infancy, childhood and adolescence.
It would seem more instructive to view the controversies Riegel sketched in
the light of the law of biogenetics. As is known, advocates of this law
believed that in ontogenesis children must repeat certain stages from the
history of humanity. Firstly, this resulted in an emphasis upon the nature of
these phases themselves and secondly, in a passive attitude towards education
(this was exactly Stanley Hall's attitude) However, this combination of the
theory of evolution and thinking in terms of stages does upset Riegel's
simplistic diagram.
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Standards deduced from adult behavior. Riegel's theses on the
influence od social factors on the development of psychology
are quite appealing but not very convincing. The epistemologi-
cal diagram classifying the four tendencies also deserves critical
attention. Piaget's classification in the upper right-hand com-
partment of the diagram, in which an active role is assumed
for the individual but a passive one for the environment, is not
entirely correct. In his early work, Piaget was very much inte-
rested in social conditions, as emerges from his discussion of
Durkheim's ideas on the social context of moral convictions. In
his later work, however, the image of a self-directed monadic
individual becomes increasingly more prevalent (see Harten,
1977). Elsewhere we have also shown that Vygotskij cannot
be accused of neglecting the active role of the individual (Van
der Veer and Van Ijzendoorn, 1982). It is clear that Riegel's
epistemological diagram is a Procrustean bed in which a num-
ber of important psychologists from whom Riegel himself drew
inspiration, are in danger of being distorted almost beyond
recognition. The diagram does, however, delineate the path he
followed in developing dialectical psychology: from a critical
reconstruction of Piaget's ideas to the fundamental dialectical
foundations RubinStejn provided psychology with. In the next
paragraph we shall follow this path.
RIEGEL AND PIAGET
The relationship between Riegel and Piaget deserves particu-
lar attention. Piaget's theories are an extremely important link
to Riegel in the development of a dialectical psychology, as is
illustrated by the fact that Piaget is the author most cited in
Foundations. In principle, Riegel was not unreceptive to Pia-
get's theory of the senso-motoric stage. In this first stage of
cognitive development, the dialectic between accomodation and
assimilation is still very clearly present. On the one hand, the
child adapts objects from the outside world to fit into available
schemata (assimilation). At one point, for example, every o-
bject is clutched, whether the object lends itself to that purpo-
se or not. The child quickly realizes that some objects are
either too heavy, cumbersome, awkward or whatever. The re-
sult is an adaption of these schemata to such facts of experien-
ce (accomodation). For a long time, for example, children are
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convinced that the amount of water in a tall, narrow glass is
greater than that same amount of water poured into a short,
wide one. They persist in that opinion even when they see it
being poured. When that same amount of water is then poured
into a third glass similar to the first, they are suddenly convin-
ced that it is the same amount of water. The contradiction
prevails until the concrete-operational stage, when the child
acquires a schema for the transformation process and its rever-
sibility. Piaget also devotes a noticeable amount of attention to
the presence of dialectical thinking in the second, pre-operatio-
nal stage. Children do not appear to be as concerned about
contradictions in their appraisals of reality — according to
Riegel with good (creative) results. When shown, for example,
twenty wooden beads, of which fifteen are painted brown and
five white, a child might conclude that there are more brown
beads than wooden ones. This is because it is incapable of
simultaneously taking account of all the different dimensions
by which beads can be classified.
Piaget's error is assumed to be that he did not define the
child's tolerance for contradictions as an example of creative
dialectical thinking. To him, it is a (fortunately) passing phase
which disappears in the transition to a higher stage through
the experience of conflicts between behaviour and judgment
(and between schemata: « décalage »).
To Riegel, this meant that Piaget analyse., children's thin-
king as being more and more alienated, non-creative and non-
dialectical. In die pre-operational phase, a child still under-
stands that an object may possess a certain quality and not
possess it simultaneously. It will not, for example, have diffi-
culty in construing a creative explanation for the fact that
some small objects float in water whilst others sink to the
bottom. In a later phase, however, the child will regard this as
an incongruous contradiction and start to look for unimaginiti-
ve rationalisations. One of these might be determining what
the relationship is between the object's size and weight in
comparison to the same relationship between a volume of wa-
ter and its weight (the notion « specific gravity »).
Riegel continually advocates the retention of dialectical a-
spects of children's thinking. Unlike Piaget, he does not wel-
come this 'alienation of thinking' towards a rigid formal-opera-
tional reasoning in which there is no place for contradictions.
This can be attributed to the Hegelian notion that dialectical
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logic is superior to formal logic and as such should replace, or
at least complement it. But whilst formal logic concerns the
formal characteristics of language, dialectical logic is a working
hypothesis for investigating real developments in the real
world. According to this hypothesis, aspects of reality are in
dialectical motion from thesis via antithesis towards synthesis.
Dialectics are therefore concerned with the world of objects,
whilst formal logic relates to the meta-level of assertions about
reality. It is therefore erroneous of Riegel to believe that a
child is thinking dialectically when it remains unconcerned a-
bout the contradictions contained, for example, in the state-
ment that a small elephant is both large and small or that a
express train travels both quickly and slowly. Indeed, making
explicit the frames of reference implicilty contained within the-
se statements results in an absolutely logical argument. We
might then 'translate' the statement concerning the elephant as
follows: in comparison to a big elephant, a small elephant is
small, but compared to a large mouse, on the other hand, a
small elephant is big. In short, Riegel wrongly places dialectics
and formal logic on the same plane: that of the analysis of
statements. Dialectical logic, however, is concerned with the
world of objects and is as such unquestionably consistent with
formal logic. It is therefore no problem at all to analyse by
means of formal logic statements which attempt to describe the
dialectical motion of reality (Klaus, 1972).
That Piaget's theory is not dialectical is, for that matter,
also contested by a number of French researchers. Goldmann, a
co-worker of Piaget in the late forties, has pointed to a num-
ber of interesting parallels between Piaget's work and the dia-
lectical epistemology of Hegel and Marx (Goldmann, 1959).
The similarities he points to in particular are the genetic ap-
proach and the unity of thought and action. As we know,
Piaget was particularly concerned with the development of in-
telligence in ontogenesis. This same emphasis upon behavioral
development is to be found in the Russian dialectical psycho-
logy of Blonskij and Vygotskij. These audiors were inspired by
the ideas of Hegel, Engels and Marx concerning the historical
origins of human behaviour.
According to Goldmann, Piaget's emphasis upon the funda-
mental unity of thought and action is in complete agreement
with Marx's ideas, in particular with respect to his cautioning
against the notion that thought is something abstract, detached
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from practical activity («Tätigkeit»). Finally, Goldmann
points out that in describing intelligence as the result of acco-
modation and assimilation, Piaget is in essence presenting the
same portrait of human activity as did Marx. Marx, indeed,
also wrote that man changes nature (assimilation) and through
it, himself (accomodation). This analysis of Piaget's theory,
recently endorsed by Garcia (Garcia, 1980), shows that whilst
he was not a Marxist, Piaget displays some striking similarities
to the thinkers of the dialectical tradition.
And yet Riegel felt obliged to neutralise the so-called an-
ti-dialectical character of Piaget's theory by adding a fifth, dia-
lectical stage to Piaget's classical stages, suggesting the transi-
tion through one or more of the « traditional » stages as a con-
dition for reaching that stage. In other words, the highest level
of dialectical thinking can be reached both through the sen-
so-motoric stage and through the pre-operational, concrete-
operational or formal-operational stages. By adding this fifth
stage, Riegel believed it was possible to expand considerably
the opportunities for equivalent inter-individual development.
Through formal operations, Riegel believes, a scientist must
enter the stage of dialectical operations in order to conduct
creative scientific work. The manual laborer might achieve that
dialectical stage by mastering concrete operations. The artist
could learn to master the dialectical skills necessary for his or
her activities even through the pre-operational level. Finally,
Riegel believed that the lover might suffice with a dialectical
intelligence acquired through the senso-motoric stage. Unfortu-
nately, Riegel fails to make his theory more convincing by not
conducting a further, more concrete analysis of the qualifica-
tion requirements for the different professions and activities.
There is absolutely no empirical basis for this theory. Here,
too, we see the strongly impressionistic nature of his work4.
Riegel also remarks that through his amendments of Piaget's
theory, intra-individual variations in intellectual functioning are
also more easily explained. Indeed, the different stages do not
exclude one another. In principle, each individual can and
4
 In his resistance to formal logic u a terminal stage of human thought,
Riegel shows a striking resemblance to V.V. Dayydoy (see, for example,
Davydov, 1972). Riegel's affinity to the cultural-historical school was also
brought out at a recent Vygotskij congress in Moscow (Davydov (ed.), 1982).
That Riegel did not explicitly refer to Vygotskij is due to the unavailability of
translations of his methodological and scientific-theoretical words.
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should be able to function at all levels (the idea of the all-
round personality). To do household chores, a scientist needs
concrete-dialectical operations, to make love senso-motoric dia-
lectical intelligence. However, Riegel errs in assuming that in-
tra-individual differences cannot be explained within the fra-
mework of Piaget's theory. In this connection, he neglects to
point out Piaget's important notion « décalage », i.e. infra-in-
dividual differences in development level depending upon ex-
perience. This phenomenon of « décalage » has an important
place in Piaget's theory of the dynamics of development, his
equilibrium theory. It has also acquired a key position in di-
dactic theories based on Piaget's theory. Riegel, however, re-
peatedly remarks that it is impossible to draw didactic conclu-
sions from this theory. The child is either in an earlier stage, so
that due to assimilative tendencies stimulation is ineffective, or
in a later stage where stimulation is superfluous5. In doing so,
though, Riegel completely loses sight of the frequent occurren-
ce of a person's functioning at a higher level in one area, and
at a lower one in another-unknown to him-area. This « décala-
ge » results in a state of tension and implies therefore oppor-
tunities for development didactics can employ (Piaget, 1976).
This also applies to inter-individual « décalages ». Kohlberg's
didactics for moral education, for example, could in certain
respects be characterised as an arsenal of methods for elimina-
ting inter — and intra — individual horizontal « décalage »
(van Ijzendoorn, 1980). Finally, it should be mentioned that
Riegel's description of Piaget's didactic paradox assumes only
the presence of assimilative tendencies whilst ignoring accomo-
dating tendencies so essential in this respect.
In short, Riegel criticizes Piaget for his neglect of the dia-
lectical character of creative and mature thought and adds that
Piaget allows too little room in his theory for parallel inter —
and intra — individual differences. With respect to the first
criticism, we have pointed to Riegel's inaccurate interpretation
of dialectical logic. Riegel's second objection is related to his
lack of knowledge of the phenomenon of « décalage », an entry
noticably absent from the indexes of his books.
s
 With this, Riegel in fact raises the same objection as Vygotskij to 'passive
education' or 'passive upbringing' in which the educator must wait passively
until the child is mature enough for the next stage of mental development
(Vygotskij, 1982).
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RIEGEL AND RUBINSTEJN
The critical reconstruction of Piaget's theory did provide
Riegel with a dialectical picture of the internal dynamics of
human development, but it did not result in explicit themes
for the influence of the social context in dialectical psychology.
But as we saw earlier, Riegel still sought descriptions of and
explanations for the changing individual in a changing society.
He now developed his alternative in this direction by consul-
ting Rubinstejn. The assumption of Rubinstejn's theory is that
at birth, the individual's development is primarily determined
by biophysical processes, but that in the course of the chrono-
logical growth of intellectual activities, cultural and social pro-
cesses play an ever greater directive role. In addition to these
interactions between the individual and society, there are also
interactions between biophysical and individual intellectual a-
ctivities. The former interaction system represents the histori-
cal dialectic, the latter the material dialectic. Riegel believed
that an individual's thoughts, actions and emotions could tran-
sform those of others living contemporaneously or subse-
quently, but with respect to contemporaries, the reverse is also
possible. With the dynamic interaction of the internal and e-
xternal dialectic, man not only transforms the external world
in which he lives. He in turn is also transformed by the world
he and others have created (Marx). A dialectical theory should
be concerned with simultaneous development along four (in-
terwoven) dimensions: the internal-biophysical, the indivi-
dual-psychological, the socio-cultural, and the external-physical
dimensions. As opposed to Rubinstejn, Riegel believed that
environmental influences should be divided into two aspects:
in addition to the socio-cultural aspect, behaviour could also be
effected by natural disasters, the geographical location and the
climate.
(material dialectic)
inter-biophysical dimension ^ ^ individual-psychological
dimension (historical
dialectic)
external-physical dimension « ^t socio-culrural dimension
FIG. 2. Riegels critical reconstruction of Rubinstejn's dialectic: the double
dialectic.
16
Riegel now sees development as the co-ordination or synch-
ronisation of any combination of two dimensions and ultima-
tely of the accumulation of progressions along each dimension.
However, co-ordination and synchronisation are not always
possible. When synchronism is absent, the result is a crisis or a
conflict. However, such a conflict should not be viewed nega-
tively. A crisis is a constructive confrontation in which contra-
diction or lack of harmony are the source of new changes, both
in the individual and in society. We shall illustrate the above
by discussing a number of his examples. At the internal-bio-
physical level, the heart and lungs can function synchronically
under normal conditions, but when the person in question is
fatigued, they might conflict with one another. But because
this concerns a conflict within one dimension, there is no que-
stion here of development. An individual may be biologically
mature enough for marriage, but because the right partner has
not yet been found, not mature at the individual-psychological
level. It is also possible that the individual-psychological and
biological levels are synchronised, but that the housing market
is tight so that socio-cultural circumstances are at odds. If a
natural disaster occurs, the external-physical circumstances mi-
ght spoil the plan. Riegel claims that everything is continually
changing and rarely in perfect harmony. From a psychological
point of view, dealing constructively with conflicts means
progress. But in Riegel's sketchy approach, what he exactly
means by « dealing constructively with conflicts » and what
conditions must be met in order not to experience and deal
with asynchronisms in a destructive fashion remains obscure.
Probably in part due to Riegel's desire not to tie himself to a
(closed) vision of man and society, even the criteria for judging
whether or not a constructive solution for an asynchronism has
been found remain implicit. In the above example of asynchro-
nism, for example, it indeed makes some difference whether
the solution is sought in the area of social action or in the
private domain. But at this point, Riegel refrains from making
any judgment. What in any case is commendable in Riegel's
theory of double dialectics is its implicit call upon developmen-
tal psychology to replace its one-sided emphasis upon the inte-
raction between the internal-biophysical and the individual-
-psychological aspects in particular with an interdisciplinary
approach devoting equal attention to all four aspects.
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TOWARDS A DIALECTICAL METHODOLOGY
Riegel's call upon developmental psychology to devote more
attention to the double dialectic, finally making it actually
possible to describe the changing individual in a changing envi-
ronment, would have had little cogency were it not for his
concern for the methodological realisation of his dialectical
theory. Such traditional research designs as the longitudinal or
cross-sectional designs are inadequate. The dialectical alternati-
ve integrating these two well-used designs at a higher level
is the so-called mixed-longitudinal design. Riegel derived
this design largely from the pioneering work of Baltes
(1965) and Schaie (1968). It dovetails perfectly with Riegel's
attempts in particular to draw into the research design the
social context in which certain developments occur. We shall
now attempt to illustrate the advantages of the mixed-longitu-
dinal design above the prevalent designs. Imagine we wish to
follow the development of a certain type of behaviour (for
example language use). Let us look at Fig. 3.
Age
20 years old 70 years old
Year of measurement Year of birth
1920 1900 1850
1970 1950 1900
FIG. 3. Different sources of variance in developmental psychological research.
On this basis, several comparisons are possible. A cross-se-
ctional design is characterised by a comparison of two cells in
the same row. In 1920, then, you might compare twenty
year-olds and seventy year-olds, people born in 1900 and
1850 respectively. In 1970, you could do the same with peo-
ple born in 1950 and 1900 respectively. By keeping the time
of measurement constant (namely 1920 or 1970), the compari-
son provides both age differences and generation differences
(also called « cohort differences »). In other words: cross-se-
ctional designs take both age differences and generation diffe-
rences into account. The two cannot, however, be separated. A
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time-lag design consists of a comparison, for example, of the
language use of twenty year-olds in 1920 and in 1970 or of
seventeen year-olds in 1920 and 1970, a comparison then of
two cells in the same column. This comparison is contaminated
by differences in time of measurement and generation. The
generation that was 20 years old in 1970 was born in 1950,
whilst the generation of twenty year-olds subjected to the test
in 1920 was born in 1900. The same applies for the seventeen
year-olds. In other words: time-lag designs furnish results in
which the variance is determined by differences in the time of
measurement and generation. The role that the two types of
differences play individually cannot, however, be distinguished.
A longitudinal design boils down to a comparison of the
same group at two different points in time (in the diagram, the
participants born in 1900; they are subjected to the test in
1920 and in 1970 at twenty and seventy years old respecti-
vely: the diagonal from upper left to lower right). A longitu-
dinal research design thus furnishes results contaminated by
both age and time of measurement differences. Thus none of
these approaches provides immediately an unadulterated esti-
mate of age, generation or time of measurement differences. A
combination of the three designs results in three comparisons
with three unknowns, namely effect of age, time of measure-
ment and generation differences. These effects can therefore be
determined exactly. We then have a so-called « mixed-longitu-
dinal design ». Psychology can then describe individual deve-
lopments, sociology can sight the cohort differences and the
historical sciences can chart the developments in the course of
(chronological) time. A concrete example: the feasible but fi-
ctitious results of a cross-sectional intelligence-study could be
represented with a curve showing a decrease in intelligence
with the increase of age.
This curve could easily be interpreted as a correspondence of
a continued regression of intellectual functioning with advan-
cing age. Quite apart from the relative value of IQ-tests, it
should be noted that the results could very well be an artifact
of the selected design. Such a cross-sectional study does not,
indeed, take account of generation differences. Tuddenheim,
for example, determined that the median of test scores of
recruits in the Second World War corresponded with the 84th
percentile of the distribution of the same scores drawn from
research among recruits in the First World War. These diffe-
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rences can, however, be attributed to historical-social changes,
for example in education, prosperity, communication media etc.
(Riegel, 1976, p. 4). In cross-sectional research, however, re-
gression resulting from historical changes is, as it were, built
into the design. An « historical » and « asocial » developmental
psychology appears to be fertile soil for such economical de-
signs. But from a scientific point of view, they are hardly
practicable. On the other hand, die mixed-longitudinal design
does allow for conclusions concerning, for example, the in-
fluence of historical-social and external-physical changes on in-
dividual-psychological and internal-biophysical development.
And so it is, indeed, a good basis for the interdisciplinary
dialectical research Riegel was such an enthusiastic proponent
of. And indeed, this « dialectical psychological » design has
found acceptance, both in the United States and in Europe
(Elder and Rockwell, 1979). It should be noted here that a
discussion has recently sprung up about the statistical merits of
mixed-longitudinal research (Adam, 1978). This technical pro-
blem aside, though, Riegel's attempt at a methodological
crystallization of his dialectical theory is to be admired. With
this, he is one of the few critical psychologists who did not
suffice with criticizing the customary methodological arsenal
but also provided constructive alternatives for realising his i-
deas. Despite his general and impressionistic approach to pro-
blems in the history and theory development of dialectical
psychology, in the area of methodology he is unexpectedly
precise in formulating his view on good, dialectically responsi-
ble research. Indeed, the mixed-longitudinal design does seem
capable of realizing the intended goal — a description of the
changing individual in a changing environment.
MERITS AND CRITICISM
In this closing paragraph, we should like to review some of
the main themes of Riegel's theory and summarize the critical
notes. We shall also point out the merits unmistakably present
in his work.
Long before the recent revival of the externalism-internalism
debate, Riegel had already made an admirable attempt to a-
nalyse the historical and social determinants of (developmental)
psychological theory development. His assumption was that
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whilst theories and schools possess dynamics of their own, they
certainly do not develop in complete isolation. He illustrated
this with a pictorial essay of the differences between the con-
tinental and American fields of psychology, tracing them to the
differences between a more mercantile or a more capitalistic so-
cial context. Unfortunately, he did not find the time to shape
and test these descriptions of general trends with more thoru-
gh investigations of the history and sociology of psychological
research.
Riegel rightly assumed that in human development, turbu-
lent periods and periods of relative calm and stability alternate,
though he perhaps laid too much emphasis upon crisis and
conflict. From Rubinstejn he derived three fundamental a-
spects of development, i.e. the internal-biophysical substratum,
the individual-psychological aspect and the socio-cultural a-
spect and shows how this results in a subtle theory of double
dialectics. To the above mentioned three aspects, he himself
added a fourth, the external-physical aspect, and argued that
the dynamics of human development should in particular be
sought in the asynchronisms between these different aspects.
Unlike Rubinätejn, who emphasized the material substratum of
every development, Riegel did not believe it opportune to at-
tribute a special role to any of the four aspects. The conclusion
might therefore very well be drawn that in doing so, Riegel
places himself outside the dialectical-materialistic tradition. In
view, however, of the state of knowledge with respect to the
determinants of ontogenesis, the question can be raised as to
what extend such an emphasis upon the material substratum
can be justified on other than an apriori basis.
Riegel derived a great deal from Piaget's theory of develo-
pment. For it is, indeed, in this theory that such great empha-
sis is laid upon the importance of unbalancing factors for a pro-
per understanding of human development. Riegel goes a step
further by almost completely denying the existence of states of
equilibrium and reducing all development to conflicts. This can
only be explained in view of the specific American misconce-
ption of Piaget's theory as a maturation and stage theory. At
the same time, Riegel attempts to supplement Piaget's theory
of cognitive development with a fifth stage, to be attained
through all the other stages, namely the stage of dialectical
cognition. However, this addition is based upon the erroneous
assumption that dialectical and formal logic can be compared.
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Unlike many other dialectica! psychologists, Riegel can boast
of a long career as an empirical researcher. That we have not
devoted much attention in this article to this aspect of Riegel's
work can be attributed to the fact that none of his studies
appears to relate very well to his scientific theoretical and
methodological starting-points. He did, though, take pains to
absorb himself in the question of which research designs were
most suitable for the dialectical research he so desired into the
changing individual in a changing society. As we saw earlier,
he had good grounds for rejecting the popular cross-sectional,
longitudinal and time-lag designs and for opting for a mixed-
longitudinal design, in which both cohort and age differences
as well as influence of the time of measurement could be
investigated.
It may be concluded that Riegel was unsuccessful in con-
structing a coherent theory of dialectical developmental psycho-
logy, and unable to convert a number of fundamental meta-theo-
retical and methodological assumptions into convincing research
practice. But it is very much to his credit that he made a
number of very critical notes on the American empirical « fa-
ctfinding » tradition. He was responsible for the theory's gai-
ning more ground within scientific work and in addition for
staging at times harsh confrontations between prevailing no-
tions and Soviet psychology.
It would be beyond the scope of this article to further di-
scuss the work of others who, following in RiegePs footsteps,
were supportive of dialectical psychology. Riegel's death cer-
tainly did not bring the movement to a standstill. In this
article we purposely focused upon one of the movement's cen-
tral figures. Only lack of space prevented us from also focusing
the spotlights on other leading representatives (Buss, Wozniak,
Younnis, Meacham, Lawler, Vandendaele).
In order to illustrate Riegel's enormous productivity and
influence, we shall close this article with a citation-analysis.
CITATION-ANALYSIS (as of January 1980)
A number of prefatory remarks:
a) The reader should regard this analysis as an operationali-
sation of our assertions concerning Klaus Riegel's influence.
b} These citations are drawn exclusively from articles (to
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the exclusion of books, dissertations and research reports).
Nonetheless, Riegel has been cited in no less than 325 publica-
tions. This is both an underestimate (because other literature
has been disregarded) and an overestimate, because Riegel o-
ften cites himself.
c) Foundations of Dialectical Psychology has not been in-
cluded in this citation-analysis; Psychology, mon amour, his last
publication is included (a book is also regarded as one publica-
tion).
a) 87 publications of Riegel are known to us. As is clear
from Table 1, from 1958 on, Riegel published with great regu-
larity.
TAB. 1
Years Number of publications
58-62 11
63-67 16
68-72 28
73-77 30
Posthumous 2
IT
High-points were 1967 (5x), 1968 (7x), 1970 (5x), 1972
(9x), 1973 <12x), 1975 <8x) and 1976 <7x).
In Table 2, a survey is given of the number of citations per
year (the years 1958 through 1974 are presented as one figure).
TAB. 2
Years Number of citations
1958-1974 98
1975 12
1976 68
1977 41
1978 64
1979 50
333 (8 counted twice)
This table shows that the interest in Riegel grew in the last
years in particular. The number of citations in the last two
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years even exceeds the frequency of the much longer period
1958-1974. In part, this is due to an explosive increase in
Riegel's productivity: nearly 60 publications in less than 10
years!
Finally, a survey is given of the most important articles, those
cited at least 10 times.
1960, R.M. Riegel, A study of changes of attitudes and inte-
rests during later years of life. Vita Humana, 3, 177 (lOx);
1965, University of Michigan Report, Internal publication
(16x);
1967, R.M. Riegel and G. Meijer, Socio-psychological factors
of aging: a cohort sequential analysis. Human Development,
10, 27 (24x);
1970, R.M. Riegel, Relational interpretation of the language
acquisition process. G.B. Flores d'Arcais and W.J.M. Levelt
(Eds.) Advances in psycholinguistics. Amsterdam: North-Hol-
land, pp. 224-236 (14x);
1972, R.M. Riegel, Development, drop and death. Develop-
mental Psychology, 6, 303-319 (47x); The influence of economic
and political ideologies upon the development of developmental
psychology, Psychological Bulletin, 78, 121-141 (42x); Time
and change in the development of the individual and society. In
H.W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and beha-
vior, New York Academic Press (18x);
1973, Developmental psychology and society: Some historical
and ethical considerations. In J.R. Nesselroade, H.W. Reese
(Eds.), Lifespan developmental psychology. Methodological is-
sues. New York: Academic Press (20x); Dialectic Operations:
the final period of cognitive development. Human Develop-
ment, 16, 346-371 (51x);
1975, From traits and equilibrium toward developmental dia-
lectics, in: WJ. Arnold and J.K. Cole (Eds.), 1974-1975
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press (30x); Towards a dialectical theory of development.
Human Development, 18, 50-64 (13x);
1976, The dialectics of human development. American Psy-
chologist, 31, 687-700 (26x); Psychology of history and deve-
lopment. New York: Plenum Press (llx).
24
REFERENCES
ADAM, J. (1978). Sequential strategies and the separation of age,
cohort and time-of-measurement contributions to developmental data.
Psychological Bulletin, 85, 1309-1316.
BALTES, PJJ, (1968). Longitudinal and cross-sectional sequences in the
study of age and generation effects. Human Development, 11
145-171.
DASBERG, L. (1979). Grootbrengen door kleinhouden. Amsterdam: Boom.
DAVYDOV, V.V. (1972). Vidy obobslenija v obulenii (logiko-psicbologice-
skie problemy postroenija ulebnych predmetov). Moscow: Pedago-
gika.
DAVYDOV, V.V. (1981). Naucnoe tvorlestvo L.S. Vygotskogo i sovreraen-
naja psicbologia. Moscow: APN SSSR.
ELDER, GJi., ROCKWELL, ,R.C. (1979). The life-course and human develop-
ment. International journal of Human Development, 2, 1-21.
GARCIA, R. (1980). Dialectique, psychogenèse et histoire des sciences. In
J. Piaget, Les formes élémentaires de la dialectique. Paris: Galli-
mard.
GOLDMANN, L. (1959), Recherches dialectiques. Paris: Gallimard.
GOOSSENS, F., VAN IJZENDOOKN, M.H. (1980). Een Duitser in Amerika.
Kritische analyse van en methodologiese werk van Klaus F. Riegel.
Psychologie en Maatschappij, 12, 384-408.
HOUTEN, H.C. (1977). Vernünftiger Organismus - oder gesellschaftliche
Evolution der Vernunft. Zur Gesellschaftstheorie de! genetischen
Strukturalismus von Piaget. Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat.
IJZENDOORN, M.H. van (1980). Moralität und politisches Beutusstsein.
Eine Untersuchung zur politischen Sozialisation. Weinheim/Basel:
Beltz.
IJZENDOOKN, M.H. van, VEER, R. van der, GOOSSENS, F. (1981). Kriti-
sche Psychologie. Drie Stromingen. Baam: Ambo.
KLAUS, G. (1972). Moderne Logik. Abriss der formalen Logik. Berlin:
VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
PAYNE, T.R. (1968). S.L. Rubinstejn and the Philosophical Foundations
of Soviet Psychology. Dordrecht: Reidel.
PIAGET, J. (1976). Genetische Epistemologie. Amsterdam: Boom.
RIEGEL, KP. (1957). Untersuchung über intellektuelle Fähigkeiten älte-
rer Menschen. Dissertation, Hamburg.
RIEGEL, KP. (1966). Development of language: Suggestions for a verbal
fall-out model, Human Development, 9, 97.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1967). History as a nomothetic science, Journal of Social
Issues, 25, 99.
RIEGEL, KP., RIEGEL, R.M., MEIJER, G. (1967). Socio-psychological fac-
tors of aging. Human Development, 10, 27.
RIEGEL, KP. (1972). Influence of economic and political ideologies on
the developmental psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 78, 129-141.
RIEGEL, KP. (1976). Psychology of history and development. New
York: Plenum Press.
RIEGEL, KP. (1978). Psychology, mon amour: A Countertext. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
RIEGEL, KP. (1979). Foundations of dialectical psychology. New York:
Academic Press.
25
SCHUB, K.W. (1965). A general model for the study of developmental
problems, Psychological Bullettin, 64, 91-108.
VEER, R. van der, VAN IJZENDOORN, M.H. (1982). Vygotskij's theory of
the higher psychological processes: Some criticisms. Leiden: Report
8130.
VYGOTSKIJ, L.S. {1982). Sobranie soiinenij. II. Problemy able] psicbolo-
gii. Moscow: Pedagogika
APPENDIX: SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF KLAUS RIEGEL
RIEGEL, K.P., RAMSEY, RM., ROTH, M. (1967). A comparison of the
first and second languages of American and Spanish students. Journal
of Verhol Learning ana Verhol Behavior, 6, 536-544.
GEKOSKI, W.L., RIEGEL, K.F. (1967). A study of the one-year stability of
the Michigan free and restricted association norms. Psychonomie
Science, 8, 427-428.
RIEGEL, K F (1968). Comparison of restricted associations among six
languages, journal of Social Psychology, 75, 67-78.
QUATERMAN, C.J., RIEGEL, K.F. (1968). Age differences in the identifica-
tion of concepts of the natural language. Journal of Experimental
Child Psychology, 6, 501-509.
RIEGEL, K.F (1968). Investigations of verbal performances and their
changes. Zeitschrift für experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie,
15, 649-692.
RIEGEL, K.F (1968). Some theoretical considerations of bilingual develop-
ment. Psychological Bulletin, 70, 647-670.
RIEGEL, K.F (1969). Changes in psycholinguistic performances with age.
In G.A. Talland (Ed.), Humen aging and behavior: Recent advances
in research and theory.
ZIVIAN, M.T., RIEGEL, K.F. (1969). Word identification as a function of
semantic dues and associative frequency. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 79, 336-341.
RŒGEL, K.F. (1969). History as a nomothetic science: Some generaliza-
tions from theories and research in developmental psychology. Jour-
nal of Social Issues, 25, 99-127.
LACHER, M.R., RIEGEL, KP. (1970). Word recognition thresholds as a
function of. instructions, type of word relations, and associative fre-
quency. Journal of General Psychology, S3, 23-33.
STERN, E.J., RIEGEL, THF. (1970). Comparisons of the restricted associa-
tion of chronic schizophrenic and normal control subjects. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 75 164-171.
RIEGEL, KF., ZIVIAN, I.WAI. (1972). Study of inter - and intralingual
associations in English and German. Language Learning, 22, 51-63.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1972). Influence of economic and political ideologies on
the development of developmental psychology. Psychological Bulle-
tin, 78, 129-141.
RIEGEL, KP., RIEGEL, RM. (1972). Development, drop, and death. Deve-
lopmental Psychology, 6, 306-319.
RIEGEL, KF. (1972). Time and change in the development of the indivi-
dual and society. H.W. Reese (ed.), Advances in child development
and behavior. VII. New York: Academic Press.
26
RIEGEL, KP. (1973). An epitaph for a paradigm: Introduction for a
symposium. Human Development, 16,1-7.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1973). language and cognition: Some life-span develop-
mental issues. Gerontologist, 13, 478-482.
RIEGEL, KP. (1973). The final period of cognitive development. Human
Development, 16, 346-370.
RIEGEL, KJ. (1973). The recall of historical events. Behavioral Science
IS, 354-363.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1973). Developmental psychology and society: Some histo-
rical and ethical considerations. In J.R. Nesselroade and H.W. Reese
(Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: Methodological issues.
New York: Academic Press.
RIEGEL, KP. (1973). On the history of psychological gerontology. In C.
Eisendorfer and M.P. Lawton (Eds.), The psychology of adult deve-
lopment and aging. Washington: American Psychological Ass.
RIEGEL, KP., GARDNER, H. (1974). Quest for mind: Piaget, Levi-
Strauss and structuralist movement. Contemporary Psychology, 19,
811-813.
RIEGEL, K.F., ANGLETTNER. A. (1977). The pooling of longitudinal stu-
dies of aging, International Journal of Aging & Human Develop-
ment, 6, 57-66.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1975). Toward a dialectical theory of development. Hu-
man Development, 18, 50-64.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1975). Subject-object alienation in psychological experi-
ments and testing. Human Development, 18, 181-193.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1975). From traits and equilibrium toward developmental
dialectics. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 23, 349-407.
RIEGEL, K.F., ROSENWALD, G.C. (1975). Structure and transformation:
Developmental and historical aspects. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1976). Dialectical operations of cognitive development.
Contributions to Human Development, 2, 60-71.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1976). A note on the modifiability and reversibility of
development and aging. International Journal of Aging & Human
Development, 7, 259-272.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1976). All the trouble with linguistics, International Jour-
nal of Psycbolinguistics, 172, 95-104.
RIEGEL, KP. (1976). The systematization of dialectical logic for the
study of development and change: An introduction. Human Develop-
ment, 19, 321-324.
RIEGEL, K.F., (1976). Dialectics of human development. American Psycho-
logist, 31, 689-700.
RIEGEL, KP., MEACHAM, J.A., eds. {1976). The developing individual in
a changing world: I. Historical and Cultural issues. Chicago: Aldine.
RIEGEL, K.F., MEACHAM, JA., eds. (1976). The developing indivi-
dual in a changing world: II. Social and environmental issues. Chica-
go: Aldine.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1976). Psychology of history and development, New
York: Plenum Press.
RIEGEL, KP. (1977). Past and future trends in gerontology. Gerontolo-
gist, 17, 105-113.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1977). The dialectics of time. In N. Datan and H.W.
27
Reese (eds.), Life-spaa developmental psychology. New York: Acade-
mic Press.
WERTHEIMER, M., BARCLAY, A.G., COOK, S.W., KIESLER, C.A., KOCH, S.,
RIEGEL, K.F., RORER, L.G., SENDERS, V.L., SMITH, MS., SPERLING,
SE. (1978). Psychology and future. America» Psychologist, 33,
631-647.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1978). Psychology, mon amour: A countertext. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
RIEGEL, K.F. (1979). Foundations of dialectical psychology. New York:
Academic Press.
Summary - Klaus F. Riegel ( 1925-1977 ) can be regarded as the enthusiastic
initiator of an American 'schoor of dialectical psychology. He criticized tradi-
tional psychology for 'losing its ties to the social-historical context. He tried
to construct an alternative dialectical paradigm, deriving a great deal from
Rubinstejn's and Piaget's theory of development. His ideas concerning the
history of psychology, his criticism of established psychological theories, and
his methodological suggestions vul be critically examined. Through a citation-
analysis, the importance of Riegel and of American dialectical psychology- will
be underlined, and a selected bibliography of Riegel is added.
Requests for reprints should be sent to M.H. Ijzendoorn or R. van der
Veer, Department of Education, Leiden University, Schuttersveld 9 (503 )
NL-2316 XG Leiden, The Netherlands.
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